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Georg Lind’s former books, Ist Moral Lehrbar? (Logos: Berlin 2000) and Moral 
ist lehrbar (Oldenbourg: Munich 2009), as well as a large number of research 
papers, leave no doubts that moral competence is an operational cognitive skill. 
Its growth and regress can be investigated and even measured with 
experimental measuring instruments (Lind 1978–2017), in particular, with the 
Moral Competence Test which has been being perfected and applied for 40 
years by Georg Lind.  
Ethicists, psychologists and educators can deliver countless descriptions 
of what morality might be: a personal trait, habitus, virtue; a set of beliefs, 
ideals, values and “internal principles” (Kohlberg 1964, p. 464);  norm-
conformist human conduct (Lind & Nowak 2015); a cognitive structure 
maturing as persons are stimulated by favorable social or educational 
environments; a set of moral emotions; a link between emotion and cognition, 
the development of which can be facilitated by social and cultural participation 
(De Waal 2016; Singer 2008; Haidt 2001); the “embodied” (tacit, intuitive, 
automatic, etc.) acts of a human cognitive apparatus (Greene & Haidt 2002; 
Greene 2015, 2016; Lind 2016), also called software in the transhumanist 
context. Today, the intuitionist and the cognitivist approach prevail over the 
classical theories of morality based on normativity, axiology and socialization. 
Nevertheless, such old-fashioned concepts as the Kantian a priori seem to be 
enjoying a naturalistic revival too (Sloan 2002).  
 Progressive concepts of morality might be one-sided simplifications 
which reduce morality to one of its core aspects, be it a set of emotions as 
'prior' to everything, be it enactivism, direct understanding, shared intentions 
and mental states, or other pre-reflective phenomena already observed in pre-
verbal infants. In fact, human minds are equiped with potentialities which need 
to be 'enacted' within interactions with others: visual, emotional, verbal, 
experiential, or conscious. Developing them, one learns how to be the subject of 
moral decisions and actions. One even learns why to be moral, and one creates 
a self-representation as a moral agent among other agents. One gets networked 
in practical and moral communities. That is the most progressive approach to 





conviction that a child's mind is a vacuum, a tabula rasa. But does the person we 
are becoming in our personal self-development (including sociomoral 
development) come from outside, i.e. from social, cultural and educational 
surroundings? Is everything that moral agents are just imparted into their 
empty minds? Are we, as moral individuals, copies of a single social and cultural 
pattern? If it is so, how can we explain such phenomena as making a choice, 
taking autonomous decisions, having moral objections, following one’s own 
conscience (an internal voice), behaving in a non-conformist way, being creative, 
finding enough civil courage to say "no" to social and political injustice, violence, 
or nonsense? Engaging in civil disobedience? Agreeing or disagreeing with 
someone else's viewpoint, and refraining from fights when we face other people 
who act extremely immorally – just restricting ourselves to a demonstration of 
legitimate moral anger?  Living in an immoral world as well as living in a world 
which is becoming immoral, dilemmatic, controversial and ambivalent is very 
challenging from the viewpoint of morality. In my opinion, living in the world is 
always challenging for morality, for we are constantly confronted with very 
new problems, conflicts and dilemmas. Yet no one is an experienced and 
trained expert in this domain here, provided with tacit knowledge and automatic 
moral competence. Moreover, living in a social world often requires collegial 
decision-making, the inclusion of others and consideration of the contrary 
views of other moral decision makers and moral agents.  
Becoming a trained and retrained expert who embodies both tacit 
knowledge and tacit skills and abilities, including the ability to make justified 
and just judgments, has at least two analogies in the history of philosophy and  
sociology. The first analogy can be Aristotelian virtue and phronesis (practical 
wisdom). According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aristotle 
"regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage, temperance) as complex rational, 
emotional and social skills." Neither skills nor practical wisdom can be 
imparted, or learned solely from general rules and theories. "We must also 
acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that 
enable us to put our general understanding of wellbeing into practice in ways 
that are suitable to each occasion" (ibidem), including those which are 
unexpected and overwhelm our command of solutions. Aristotle expounded a 
combination of particular virtues, but proficiency, habituation, and strength (in 
Latin vis moralis, in German Stärke) are common aspects of all the virtues 
incorporated by human beings. 
The second analogy for tacit/automatic morality (called "embodied 
cognition" by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt) can be found in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (1987). He emphasized that our skills can be strengthened 
most efficiently in shared social practice, almost "from body to body," but also 
through participation in structured, instructed and institutionalized practice. 
This offers an efficient way to develop "Habitus" and "virtuosity." "Habitus 
incorporates former experiences and unconsciously structures cognition" 





(Gärtner 2013, p. 348). However, Bourdieu's conception does not match virtue 
as considered in terms of moral skills, in other words: as an ability to make 
moral choices and decisions case by case, conflict by conflict, dilemma by 
dilemma. Automatism and tacit knowledge may lead to routinized, 
standardized and unreflecting ways of behaving, or even to the regression of 
human potentialities for autonomy. 
Moral behavior is very different in nature: diversified and specific 
problems (as well as pluralism and difference) challenge the ability to make 
choices and decisions. Repeating the same patterns could imply bad routines 
for moral decisionism, i.e., a thoughtless multiplication of the same solutions. 
In contrast, moral competence is demonstrated by showing proficiency and 
virtuosity in making demanding and new context-related decisions. Moral 
competence has to shuffle and reshuffle a myriad of normative criteria, the 
future consequences of actions, etc. for each morally engaging situation (not 
only for types and categories of situations). It does not always occur in a 
conscious and deliberative way. Trained and retrained moral competence 
deals with decision-making easily, 'automatically'. Does automatism leave 
enough space for personal autonomy, responsibility and self-consciousness?   
 
 It is exciting to observe how fast the paradigms of morality shift and 
change, and how they oscillate from one extreme to another, as, for example, 
from the conscious (manifest) level of morality to the unconscious, from the 
emotional level to the cognitive, rational and conscious “origins” of morality 
and moral judgment making. In this respect, Aristotle's claim was right. His 
concept of moral skill (ability, competence) mirrored his golden rule: no 
extremes, but, instead a moral ability that includes aspects that are cognitive 
and affective, silent and deliberative, as well as normative, judgmental, and 
situational. Despite the varied content of norms and ideals, moral ability can be 
identified across cultures, genders, political regimes, confessions, and maybe 
even across species – the moral behaviour of human and primates reveals 
some affinities.  
But how to approach moral competence in a non-reductionist, holistic 
way that would be acceptable to both psychology and philosophy? Apparently, 
situating Georg Lind's most recent book entitled How to teach morality? (2016) 
in the field of moral-experimental psychology as well as classical moral 
philosophy shows that he contributes to the holistic concept of moral 
competence, being clearly in favour of the cognitive turn and in respect of 
emotionality, too.  
Lind refers to the concept of cognitive interactionism, whose successor 
is the enactivism of today. According to Lind's early approach, shared with 
Kohlberg, Wakenhut, and others (Lind 1985), moral–judgmental structures in a 





or her social environment” (Lind 1985, p. 43). Judgmental structures can be 
strengthened if moral reasoning is repeatedly trained and retrained.  
 With respect to these discoveries, Georg Lind asks: "is there really 
such a thing as moral competence? Can it be shown as manifest disposition in 
human behavior? (...) Do people prefer high-type moral orientations and reject 
low-type orientations, the higher the moral competence is?" (2015, p. 74). "(...) 
morality in its core is a skill" (p. 75) and its development correlates with the 
quality of education in terms of cognitive–developmental psychology, and with 
the quality of interpersonal enactivism, as outlined by Shaun Gallagher. If their 
approaches are false, we have to stop considering moral agency, autonomy, 
social interactions, virtues, flourishing, perfectibility, responsibility, moral 
identity, and moral education as well. Rather, we should settle for experiencing a 
series of contingent moral 'episodes' (Strawson 2007) that happen 
automatically.   
 Georg Lind holds that an observable, manifest moral performance 
(deliberative, discursive, and unconscious/tacit judgmental acts) constitutes 
evidence of moral competence. According to Habermas and Lind, "competence 
by itself cannot be shown to exist except in its concrete manifestation, that is, 
through phenomena of performance" (Lind 1985, p. 25).  
Today, neuroscientists are able to locate the neural correlates for moral 
competence in the human brain. "The neuroanatomy of moral judgment" has 
been described extensively by Greene and Haidt (2002), and others. As Greene 
asserts, "deontological judgments are associated with increasing activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region associated with cognitive control" 
(Greene 2009, p. 582). Prehn et al. (2008) confirmed that selected neural areas 
are associated with moral reasoning and judgment making.  
How does moral cognition work? It can work in both an unconscious or 
conscious way. “Unconscious” does not necessarily mean irrational; on the 
other hand, “conscious” does not necessarily means rational. For example, 
instincts, emotions, and intuitions might be an evolutionary inheritance in 
human minds, of an “unconscious” character. However, humans learn and 
develop some conscious tools to understand their natural impulses and to 
navigate them. Peter Singer and Georg Lind´s statements show some affinities: 
humans are equipped with moral emotions (including empathy) through 
evolution, but they need more advanced instruments to deal with the 
demanding social contexts in which decisions are required. Following instincts 
and emotions is not enough in the social world. 
 It was complexity that inspired Jonathan Haidt (2001; Haidt & Greene 
2002) to create the so-called intuitionist hypothesis. The intuitionist hypothesis 
was devised as a simple remedy for the complex world. It reduced moral 
judgment making to sudden "automatic affective reactions", as Greene and 
Haidt (2002, p. 517) put it. At the end of 20th century "the affective revolution 
was reinforced by a new focus on 'automaticity' – the mind's ability to solve 





many problems, including high-level social ones, unconsciously and 
automatically," (Greene & Haidt 2002, p. 517) when judgment makers are 
confronted with moral challenges. We can easily find a counterargument: some 
people are less empathetic and less sensitive decision makers: they remain cold 
and show reflective moral reasoning, instead of automatic and emotional 
reasoning.  
Subsequent experimental "findings in evolutionary psychology and 
primatology began to point to the origins of human morality in a set of 
emotions (linked to expanding cognitive abilities) that make individuals 
care about the welfare of others (e.g., altruism, including feelings of sympathy), 
and about cooperation, cheating, and norm-following" (Greene & Haidt 2002, 
p. 517). Haidt created the category of "intuiton" as a link between emotion and 
cognition. "Intuitions" might be shaped in individual minds by evolution and 
sociocultural experience as well.  
We observe the increasing role of cognition in the intuitionist 
hypothesis and theory of emotion as well (Bloom 2016), which is, however, 
ultimately only a moderate role. According to Haidt and Greene, "people 
certainly do engage in moral reasoning, but (...) these processes are typically 
one-sided efforts in support of pre-ordained [automatically, unconsciously 
made, E.N.] conclusions. Moral reasoning matters, but it matters primarily 
in social contexts". This is a very provocative moment for researchers who are 
familiar with ethics and social psychology: moral problems and, in 
consequence, moral reasoning, are usually superindividual, interpersonal and 
social in nature. Moral conflicts and problems often arise between persons, 
within social relationships – not in an isolated mind. Our internal and personal 
problems and conflicts often mirror interpersonal conflicts and tensions, or 
even originate from them. Thus, moral reasoning is rooted in moral cognition 
and cannot be underestimated or replaced by automatic personal decisionism, 
which cannot be articulated and shared with other human fellows.      
 Another controversial side-effect of the intuitionist approach is as 
follows: "people can very easily construct post-hoc reasons to justify their 
actions and judgments" (Greene & Haidt 2002, p. 517), in particular 
judgments which have been made in an automatic and unconscious way. 
 Approaching morality from the intuitionist perspective leads to a very 
sad conclusion: firstly, conscious moral reasoning, reflection, arguing, and 
justification etc. brings as much belated conjecture as post facto confabulation; 
secondly, such confabulation is ranked as a secondary justification of an 
automatic/unconscious judgment. Thirdly, the rational discourse of morality 
does not have any relevant impact on passing moral decisions and seeking 
solutions; and solutions are required. Moreover, justifications are required too. 
Following the intuitionist approach, a decision maker must be trained and 
experienced to be able to cope with moral problems without using reflective 





competence to the "wagging" of our internal emotional dog's tail, just to recall 
the title of Jonathan Haidt's paper of 2001, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational 
Tail. In his reaction to Haidt's emotional reductionism, Georg Lind does not 
respond with another reductionism, i.e., cognitive reductionism. Instead, he 
asks the following question: 
Is our reason nothing more than a tail which our internal 
emotional dog is wagging? This way of questioning is wrong . It 
presupposes that our mind only works in a verbal way, and our 
emotions express themselves only in biological reactions as 
hunger and thirst. But reason, it is not only conscious and 
verbal knowledge... It is also tacit knowledge (...) Wasel (2007) 
showed, we can consciously change our stereotypes (for ex. about 
another gender, foreigners etc.). We may engage ourselves 
consciously in unconscious judgmental processes (Lind 2015, pp. 
23–24).    
The human mind is able to develop a link between conscious and 
unconscious processes. Emotions and affects, in particular the moral ones or 
morally relevant ones, can be understood by, involved in, and transformed or 
translated into, the cognitive or just more holistic processes in the human mind. 
Lind describes the role of emotionality without falling into reductionism: he 
just assumes that moral judgments do not originate from raw and blind 
emotions. The role of emotions for morality is significant and is not neglected 
by Lind. However,  
It would be wrong to assume that we are at the mercy of our 
moral emotions. We can educate them (...). The fact that the 
feelings we have are often not conscious and that decision-
making process runs at lightning speed does not contradict with 
the view that they are the product of highly complex cognitive 
systems in which our experiences and reasons are stored. This 
means that, although they are innate, the feelings change and 
develop as a result of our experiences. That is, we ourselves can 
use our judgment and reason to influence them purposefully 
through training (Lind 2016, p. 29).  
The last decade brought another kind of reductionism, based on 
automatic (tacit), strictly cognitive decision making. Indeed, Greene and other 
radical cognitivists make moral decision makers' efforts significantly lighter. 
Neither emotions nor time-consuming reasoning are required when, in 
particular, the utilitarian calculus is employed. Moral economy matters in the 
domain of cognitive science. It is Joshua Greene who seems to deny the role of 
moral emotions in moral judgment making, at least in his recent writings. In 
contrast with Lind, Greene belongs to the radical cognitivist party which 
also denies the role of manifest, conscious reasoning preceding moral 
judgments or decisions. Greene describes the brain’s “machinery” in the 
following way:  





what we call ´moral cognition´, is just the brain´s general-purpose 
cognitive machinery – machinery designed to learn from 
experience, represent value and motivate its pursuit, represent 
mental states, imagine events, reason, and resist impulses – 
applied to problems that we, for high–level functional reasons, 
identify as ´moral´. If all this is correct, it explains why the field of 
moral cognition has been so varied and why that is unlikely to 
change. That what we call ´moral cognition´, is just the brain´s 
general-purpose cognitive machinery – machinery designed to 
learn from experience, represent value and motivate its pursuit, 
represent mental states, imagine events, reason, and resist 
impulses – applied to problems that we, for high-level functional 
reasons, identify as ´moral´. If all this is correct, it explains why 
the field of moral cognition has been so varied and why that is 
unlikely to change. We are explaining moral thinking in terms of 
its more basic cognitive components, which are not specific to 
morality” (Greene 2015, p. 40).  
For Georg Lind, moral judgment competence is a distinct, originally 
and specifically moral sub-domain of the entire cognition we possess as natural, 
socialized, and educated beings. It is different to (1) a spontaneous, automatic, 
emotional, or intuitive impulse and different to (2) an act of an emotionally 
indifferent, “cognitive machinery”. Rather, moral judgment competence is to be 
defined as "an ability to apply a certain moral orientation in a consistent 
[manner, as trained, developed, trustworthy moral subjects] and differentiated 
manner in varying social situations" (Prehn et al. 2007, p. 44).  
At the same time, in the process of moral judgment making, given steps 
“may be performed unconsciously” and implicitly (Haidt 2001, p. 7) and 
some other steps – consciously and explicitly (Lind 2016, p. 56). Analogically, 
given steps may be provided with more “affective valence,” as Haidt (2001, p. 7) 
stresses, and some other steps – with more rational evidence.  
In his book, How to Teach Morality, Lind consequently advocates his 
dual-aspect concept of morality which contains none of the emotional factors 
but, instead, engages some affective aspects, such as the “affective valence” 
experienced by moral agents who personify moral orientations and apply them 
when they pass moral decisions.  
Still, it is moral competence which enables persons to apply moral 
orientations as moral criteria for their articulated reasoning or tacit judgment. 
Reasoning and judging seem to be processual in nature. Processuality requires 
cognition, as it is comprehended by cognitive psychologists, in contrast with 
neuroscientists, who advocate the quick and automatic acts of "embodied 
cognition". An 'act' refers to the final step of the process, i.e., to its conclusion: it 
is like issuing a sentence after a dispute.    
Most probably, articulated and manifest moral reasoning and judgment 
provides human action with more consistency, justification, trustfulness, and 





(Gallagher 2005; De Jaegher 2009) can be experienced, but humans are social 
beings and they need articulated reflection, self–reflection, and discourse-
mediated communication. Moral cognition and, in particular, moral 
competence is more complex because a human being's feeling of being situated 
in the social world is much more complex than any other living being's life. My 
assertion implies neither an anthropocentric nor an “anthropodenial” 
conclusion (De Waal 2016).       
Being a cognitive psychologist, Lind distinguishes between two layers 
of cognitive moral competence. The first layer would be an unconscious, 
inner disposition of moral competence; the second layer – a conscious, actual, 
manifest reasoning process the conclusion of which will be a concrete moral 
judgment, or decision. Human beings learn to discursively express, improve 
(to make them just), and to justify their judgments to significant extent, but 
some aspects of moral judgment making most probably remain unconscious.  
 Interviews with people who are inexperienced in employing moral 
reasoning and making judgments in a non-intuitionist but conscious way 
(Nowak et al., survey “What is morality", 2017) reveal that their ability to 
explain any reasons for their judgments is poor. They are not aware of the 
meaning of the basic terms in which they try to describe morality. In contrast, 
those people who are trained in moral reflection and discourse are able to 
better understand their own intuitive judgments, to articulate them, and to 
explain their meaning. They are also able to observe how their opinion develops 
and evolves when new arguments broaden the world's representation in their 
mind, or convince them. That is tangible proof of the cognitive potential of 
articulated moral (ethical) reasoning. Articulated reasoning contributes to both 
a persons' moral awareness and self–awareness, as well as to the silent, tacit, 
unconscious moral cognition advocated by Greene and Haidt. In their dualistic 
approach to morality, they omit a link between conscious and unconscious. 
Such a link can be useful for bridging the gap (or even solving the "conflict") 
between "production of impersonal moral judgments" and the production of 
"personal moral judgments" (Greene & Haidt 2002, p. 522)       
 Exploring moral competence to find its most adequate description and 
to prove its dual (conscious and unconscious, cognitive and affective) nature 
remains the task of cross-disciplinary research. Georg Lind´s research, much 
more than others', strongly contributes to a balanced, non-reductionist and 
empirical evidence-based approach to explaining a competent moral subject 
and interactive member of a society. 
Lind also shows that moral competence can be strengthened, trained 
and retrained. This implies a double effect: personal and interpersonal. 
According to Habermas, it is a self-governance that “is achieved by a system 
of internal behavior controls which is triggered by principled moral 
judgment, that is, by motive-forming convictions, and which makes self-
governance possible. This system must function autonomously” (Habermas 





2010, p. 13); otherwise helplessness, or external control, domination, 
subversion, manipulation etc. follow. Living in a democratic society requires 
autonomous judgment, and its justification (How can I defend my judgment, 
argue in favor of my claim? How can I formulate critical arguments against 
unjust public institutions? How to become involved in the animal rights 
movement? etc.).  
Furthermore, democratic life requires an ability to solve conflicts and 
deal with different, or even opposing interests, preferences, and opinions: it is 
typical for a democratic lifestyle. Today, people face other human fellows hailing 
from different cultural, religious, economic contexts. We are all challenged by 
new dilemmas and conflicts. Some of them are personal, while others are 
interpersonal, social, public, or even international.  
Moral competence contributes to the ability to resolve problems more 
than emotion, intuition and tacit "embodied" skills. We need moral competence 
as well as “the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal 
moral principles through thinking and discussion, instead of using violence, 
deceit, and force” (Lind 2016, p. 45). They can and should be fostered, just as all 
kinds of cognitive skills are.  
The number of reasons why we should train moral competence 
constantly increases. My own experience with moral competence training 
using the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion brings additional evidence 
for Lind's claim that “based on this [morality-as-competence] definition we 
assume that the greater the problem, the better this ability must be developed” 
(Lind 2015, p. 45). Furthermore,  
 
If the problems grow over our heads because social change is 
great, but our educational institutions (parents, schools, and 
universities) have not given sufficient opportunity for the 
development of moral competence, then we fall back on lower 
forms of conflict resolution such as violence, fraud, and force. If 
that also does not help then we call for a strong power that solves 
our problems and conflicts for us – which amounts to the 
abolition of democratic coexistence in favor of dictatorship (Lind 
2016, p. 45). 
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Abstract: This short review paper focuses on Georg Lind's approach to 
the moral competence as described in his recent book (2016) How To 
Teach Morality? Promoting Deliberation and Discussion, Reducing Violence and 
Deceit. Berlin: Logos Verlag. Lind's dual-aspect approach is discussed as 




Intuitionist approach and "embodied cognition" are not enough, the author (E. 
Nowak) claims. As participants of social contexts and institutions, we need 
manifest, discoursively articulated reflection, self-reflection, and conversation. 
However, Lind's hypothesis of two leyers of morality, i.e., a conscious and 
unconscious finds evidence in cognitive sciences too. Lind's approach is not as 
reductionist as that of radical cognitivists. On the contrary, it combines all 
relevant aspects of moral cognition discussed right now, worldwide – when 
cognitive sciences flourish and the challenges for moral mind grow up 
dramatically.     
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